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Currie: Opening the Floodgates: The Roberts Court's Decision in Rapanos v

2007]
OPENING THE FLOODGATES: THE ROBERTS COURT'S
DECISION IN RAPANOS v. UNITED STATES SPELLS TROUBLE
FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WATERS
OF THE UNITED STATES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 1960s saw a marked increase in America's awareness of the
environment's increasingly dilapidated state.' Since the dawn of
the industrial revolution, the environment has been subject to
man's neglect, and during the 1960s the effects of this neglect
could no longer evade the nation's attention. 2 The dire state of
America's bodies of water was of particular concern: at that time,
the Potomac River was too polluted for people to safely swim in,
Lake Erie was practically "dead" and the Cuyahoga River actually
burst into flames after a lit match was thrown into its contaminated
waters. 3 The Clean Water Act (CWA or Act), enacted by Congress
in 1972, represents the response of our nation's elected officials to
the alarming degradation of the nation's waters. 4 Congress drafted
the CWA with the intent of accomplishing a Herculean goal - restoring the "integrity" of our nation's waters.5 In effectuating this
purpose, Congress granted the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)
the responsibility of enforcing much of the regulation of this ambi6
tious Act.
1. See William D. Ruckelshaus, Environmental Protection: A Brief History of the
EnvironmentalMovement in America and the Implications Abroad, 15 ENVrL. L. 455, 455
(1985) (describing rise of environmental awareness in the 1960s). Ruckelshaus
explained that, while environmental concerns had always existed in America, it was
not until the 1960s that these issues became a major national concern. See id.
2. See id. at 455-56 (discussing cause of environmental awareness during
1960s).
3. See id. at 457-58 (discussing fire on Cuyahoga River and ensuing damage).
See also Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water Action Plan
(Feb. 19, 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/cwa/03.htm
(describing major environmental concerns that occurred prior to enactment of
CWA).
4. See Eric Pianin, EPA to Allow Polluters to Buy Clean Water Credits:Environmental
Groups Say Policy Weakens Law, WASH. PosT, Jan. 14, 2003, at A03 (discussing purpose of CWA).
5. See Kimberly Breedon, Comment, The Reach of Raich: Implicationsfor Legislative Amendments andJudicialInterpretationsof the Clean Water Act, 74 U. CIN. L. REv.
1441, 1444-45 (2006) (explaining purpose of CWA).
6. See id. at 1445 (explaining authority EPA and Congress granted to Corps).
See also Jon Schutz, The Steepest Hurdle in Obtaining a Clean Water Act Section 404
Permit: Complying with EPA's 404(B)(1) Guidelines' Least Environmentally Damaging
PracticableAlternative Requirement, 24 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 235, 236 (2006)
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Although many argue that the CWA performed admirably in
accomplishing such lofty expectations, 7 others take issue with the
means the Corps employs when enforcing the statute. 8 Until recently, the Corps possessed broad authority to enforce the CWA,
having the discretion to determine when and where to impose limitations on citizens' proposed uses of the nation's waterways. 9
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Rapanos v. United
States (Rapanos)10 put an abrupt end to the Corps's ability to impose
environmental regulations on the nation's waters based on their interpretation of the CWA. 11 In Rapanos, the Supreme Court issued a
plurality decision that precludes the Corps's authority to impose
CWA restrictions on the use of wetlands that feed into our nation's
waters based solely on its own ecological conclusions. 12 The decision stands as a significant setback for the further success of the
CWA and threatens to have a harmful effect on the nation's water
quality.1 3 Moreover, because Rapanos represents the first major environmental issue considered by the "Roberts" Court, the result
reached is even more unsettling because newly-appointed Justices
Alito and Roberts aligned themselves with the opinion of Justice
Scalia, which called for dramatic restrictions on decades old envi14
ronmental legislation.
(explaining Corps's authority to grant permits discharging dredged material pursuant to CWA section 404).
7. See Donna Frye, The Clean Water Act: Thirty Years Later, SAN DIEco EARTH
TIMES, Nov. 2002, available at http://www.sdearthtimes.com/et102/et102s6.
html) (discussing success of CWA).
8. See generally, Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2220-21 (2006) (asserting Corps's enforcement of CWA as impermissible); see also id. at 2235-36 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (asserting Corps's enforcement of CWA as impermissible).
9. See id. (explaining breadth of Corps's authority in granting section 404
permits).
10. 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
11. See Schutz, supra note 6, at 236 (explaining Corps's authority under section 404).
12. See generally Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (explaining holding).
13. See Charlie Tebbutt, Ruling Befouls Clean Water Efforts; A New Voting Bloc Ur
the U.S. Supreme Court is Endangering 34 Years of Protectionsfor Our Nation's Streams
and Wetlands, THE REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, OR), Aug. 20, 2006, at F1 (describing
current makeup of Supreme Court and implications of Rapanos decision).
14. See David G. Savage, The New Term; How Much of an Umpire is the ChiefJustice?, L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 24, 2006, at M3 (describing current makeup of Supreme
Court and implications of Rapanos decision).
For more than three decades, these [CWA] federal regulations on wetlands and streams had stood, through Republican and Democratic administrations and through GOP- and Democratic-controlled Congresses.
Yet, with one extra vote, the Roberts court would have rewritten the scope
of the Clean Water Act in its first term - not the act of a modest Supreme Court.
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This Note examines the Supreme Court's decision in Rapanos
v. United States.15 Section II states the facts that gave rise to the Supreme Court's decision. 16 Section III discusses the background of
the CWA and the Supreme Court's two prior decisions regarding
the scope of the Corps's jurisdiction under the CWA.1 7 Section IV
presents the three distinct opinions offered by the Supreme Court
in Rapanos.'8 Section V evaluates the opinions offered by Justices
Scalia and Kennedy. 19 Section VI assesses the potential impact of
20
the Supreme Court's holding.
II.

FACTS

The Supreme Court's decision in Rapanos v. United States involved two separate civil actions. 2 1 In Case No. 04-1034, the United
States brought civil enforcement proceedings against defendant
John Rapanos.2 2 In Case No. 04-1384, Keith and June Carabell
sued the government after the Corps refused to issue them a permit
to deposit fill into a wetland. 23 The cases were consolidated for the
purpose of addressing the issue of what constitutes a "wetland"
24
under the CWA.

John Rapanos possessed three large plots of land in Michigan,
which he intended to use for commercial development, and he
asked that the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
(MDNR) inspect one of the properties. 25 After viewing the property, an MDNR inspector informed Rapanos that it likely contained
areas that may be classified as "waters of the United States" under
section 404 of the CWA and sent him an application for a section
Id. See also, Tebbutt, supra note 13, at F1 (explaining implications of Court's decision in Rapanos).
15. For a discussion of the propriety of the result reached by the Supreme
Court in Rapanos, see infra notes 118-64 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the facts, see infra notes 21-40 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the origin of the CWA and the case law addressing the
act, see infra notes 41-73 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the opinions authored by Justices Scalia, Kennedy and
Stevens in Rapanos, see infra notes 74-117 and accompanying text.
19. For a critical analysis of the plurality opinion in Rapanos, see infra notes
118-64 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the potential impact of the Supreme Court's decision
in Rapanos, see infra notes 165-91 and accompanying text.
21. See Rapanos, 126 S.Ct. 2208, 2211 (2006) (explaining procedural background of Supreme Court's decision).
22. See id. (explaining procedural background of decision).
23. See id. at 2219 (describing facts of Carabell's case).
24. See id. at 2220 (explaining procedural background of decision).
25. See id. at 2253 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing facts of case).
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404 permit. 26 Upon receiving the application, Rapanos hired a wetland consultant to advise him of the likelihood that the permit

would be granted. 27 After hearing that his property contained
large areas of wetlands, Rapanos threatened to "'destroy' [his wetland consultant] if he did not destroy the wetland report and refused to pay" for the consultant's services unless the consultant
28
complied with his demand.
Rapanos began developing all three properties without applying for the required permits, hiring a construction company to
clear the land, fill in low areas of the land and drain subsurface
water. 29 Rapanos prevented the MDNR from visiting his property
and later ignored both a cease-and-desist letter issued by the MDNR
and an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrative
compliance order. 30 The federal government brought a civil action
against Rapanos, charging him with acting in violation of the
CWA. 3 1 The district court upheld the Corps's jurisdiction and
found the petitioner had violated the CWA on all three of his plots
32
of land, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision.
The Carabells' case against the government was much more
straightforward. 33 The Carabells owned twenty acres in Macomb
County, Michigan, sixteen of which were deemed wetlands. 3 4 The
wetlands in question bordered a ditch "that flow[ed] into a drain
that flow[ed] into a creek that flow[ed] into" a lake. 3 5 These wet36
lands were separated from the ditch by a manmade berm.

The Carabells intended to use the land as the site of a condominium complex.3 7 After inspecting the site, the Water Quality
Unit of Macomb County lobbied the Corps to deny the Carabells
their permit, finding that construction on the wetlands "would have
an unacceptable adverse effect on wildlife, water quality and conser26.
case).
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
of case).
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
case).
37.

See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2253 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing facts of
See id. (Stevens,
See id. (Stevens,
See id. (Stevens,
See id. (Stevens,
See Rapanos, 126

J., dissenting) (discussing facts of case).
J., dissenting) (discussing facts of case).
J., dissenting) (discussing facts of case).
J., dissenting) (discussing facts of case).
S.Ct. at 2239 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing facts

See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing procedural history).
See id. at 2254 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing facts of case).
See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing facts of case).
See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing facts of case).
See Rapanos, 126 S.Ct. at 2253 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing facts of
See id. at 2254 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing facts of case).
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vation of wetlands resources. ' 38 The Corps denied the Carabells a
39
permit, and the Carabells sought judicial review of the decision.
The district court granted the Corps summary judgment, and the
40
Sixth Circuit affirmed on appeal.

III.
A.

BACKGROUND

History of the CWA

In 1972, Congress enacted the CWA with the stated purpose of
"restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of [the] Nation's waters. ' 41 The Act was ambitious,
aiming to eliminate the discharge of pollutants into national waterways by 1985.42 Congress ceded the power to enforce the CWA
43
jointly to the EPA and the Corps.
The EPA possesses broad authority in the administration of the
CWA, as it is charged with the duty to promulgate regulations punishable by both civil and criminal penalties under the Act. 44 The
Corps's authority under the Act is limited to administering the issuance of permits under CWA section 404. 45 Section 404 regulates
the discharge of pollutants into the nation's waters, and it is the
Corps's duty to ensure that permit-seekers are in compliance with
46
the EPA's substantive water-quality protection regulations.
The scope of the CWA does not cover merely America's major
bodies of water; rather, the Act aims to protect "all waters of the
'United States."47 Although the Act does not clearly define what
38. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing facts of case).
39. See id. at 2240 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing facts of case).
40. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing procedural background of
case).
41. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (stating purpose of
CWA). The CWA is codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
42. See id. § 1251(a)(1) (describing goals of CWA).
43. See Breedon, supra note 5, at 1444-45 (discussing Congress's grant of administrative authority to Corps and EPA).
44. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rule with the Force
of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HAgv. L. REv. 467, 584 (2002) (describing
authority vested in CWA).
45. See Breedon, supra note 5, at 1445 (discussing Corps's role in administering CWA).
46. See id. (discussing Corps's role in administering CWA).
47. See id. (emphasis added) (discussing scope of CWA). See also CWA, 33
U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000) (defining term "waters" under CWA). The CWA defines
"waters" as "navigable waters" and "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas." See id.
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constitutes the "waters of the United States," both the EPA and the
Corps have acted to sculpt the definition through regulation. 48
Of all the bodies of water regulated under the CWA, those
deemed "wetlands" are perhaps the most controversial. 4 9 The EPA
defines wetlands as:
[T]hose areas that are inundated or saturated by surface
or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to
support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life
in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include
50
swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.
The inclusion of the nation's wetlands in the CWA was not merely
incidental; these bodies of water were included specifically because
they are crucial to the preservation of the quality of the nation's
waters. 5 1 The various habitats that comprise the nation's wetlands
'5 2
are the "primary pollution control systems of the nation's waters.
Wetlands serve critical functions for the nation's environment they remove "heavy metals" and pollutants from the water and purify groundwater - thereby "providing municipal drinking water
supplies for towns and cities across the country."5 3 Eradication of
the nation's wetlands results in adverse consequences for both the
environment and the nation as a whole, threatening to deplete the
natural environment of many species, while hampering commercial
54
and recreational activities enjoyed by the American public.
B.

Case Law

In 1985, the Supreme Court for the first time addressed the
Corps's regulatory authority to define the "the waters of the United
States" in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes (Riverside
Bayview).5 In that case, the defendant, Riverside Bayview, at48. See 33 C.F.R. pt. 328.3(a) (2002) (Corps); 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.3(s) (2002)
(EPA) (providing definitions of "waters of the United States").
49. See Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Environmental Federalism: Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Considerationof Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404
and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REv. 1242, 1243 (1995) (stating that
federal wetlands regulation may be most controversial issue in environmental law).
50. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 230.3(s) (2002) (providing EPA definition of wetlands).
51. See Houck & Rolland, supra note 49, at 1244-45 (discussing reason for inclusion of wetlands within protection of CWA).
52. See id. (discussing pollution control function of wetlands).
53. See id. (discussing pollution control function of wetlands).
54. See id. (discussing adverse effects caused by destruction of wetlands).
55. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985)
(stating issue presented).
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tempted to place fill material into low-level marshland that it possessed. 56 The Corps brought an action in the Eastern District Court
of Michigan to enjoin the defendants from continuing their filling
activities. 5 7 The Corps argued that the property properly fell within
the definition of "waters of the United States" under the CWA because it was an "adjacent wetland," which, if misused, could adversely affect interstate commerce. 5 8 The Eastern District Court of
Michigan held in favor of the Corps, but the Sixth Circuit reversed,
finding the term "adjacent waters" to apply only to those adjacent
waters that were subject to flooding by navigable waters at a frequency sufficient to allow the wetlands to support aquatic
59
vegetation.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Sixth Circuit. 60 The Court, relying heavily on its prior
decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. (Chevron),61 rejected the Sixth Circuit's narrow interpretation
of the term "wetlands," finding instead that where an agency, such
as the Corps, construes a charging statute to have a certain meaning, that meaning "is entitled deference if it is reasonable and not
in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress. '6 2 With respect
to the CWA, the Court concluded that it was Congress's intent to
create a broad definition of the term "waters." 63 Furthermore, because the goal of the CWA was to protect the waters of the United
States and because the Corps determined that the pollution of wetlands such as those in dispute could have an adverse effect on such
waters, the Court found that the Corps had reasonably construed
the term "wetlands" that lay adjacent to waters of the United States
64
as fitting within the CWA's definition of "waters."
The Supreme Court next addressed the Corps's regulatory jurisdiction in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (SWANCC).65 In that case, the Court considered
56. See id. at 124 (discussing facts of case).
57. See id. (discussing facts of case).
58. See id. (discussing facts of case).
59. See id. (discussing facts of case).
60. See generally Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 124 (describing holding of case).
61. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
62. See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131 (explaining rationale of Court's
holding).
63. See id. at 133 (explaining congressional intent in defining term "waters"
for purposes of CWA).
64. See id. at 134-35 (explaining Corps's authority to define term "waters"
under CWA).
65. 531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC].
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whether the Corps properly interpreted CWA section 404 as granting it the authority to regulate land that provided a habitat for migratory birds. 66 More specifically, the Court was required to
determine the validity of the Corps's authority to impose restrictions on wetland activities based on the "Migratory Bird Rule," a
rule the Corps created in 1986 for the purpose of asserting jurisdiction over isolated waters on the basis that migratory birds were "de67
pendent" on these waters.
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (Solid
Waste Agency) proposed to dispose of solid waste on an abandoned
533-acre plot of land. 68 Part of the proposed land consisted of both

permanent and non-permanent ponds. 69 After realizing that several species of migratory birds inhabited the area, the Corps refused to issue the agency a 404 permit on the grounds that the
70
petitioner's actions were in violation of the "Migratory Bird Rule."

The Solid Waste Agency sued the government, arguing that the
Corps did not have jurisdiction over the land-locked ponds. 7
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners and refused to
give credence to the Corps's belief that they possessed the authority
to extend the term "navigable waters" to the isolated ponds at issue
in the case. 72 The Court reasoned that permitting the EPA and the
Corps "to claim federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling
within the 'Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land
73
and water use."
IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

The outcome of the Supreme Court's Rapanos decision is complicated given that no single opinion captured a majority vote.7 4
66. See id. at 162 (describing issue of case).
67. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2256 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing issue in SWANOC).
68. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 163 (describing facts of case).
69. See id. at 164 (describing facts of case).
70. See id. (describing facts of case). The Migratory Bird Rule was created by
the Corps and proposes to include those lands used by migratory birds as wetlands
for purposes of the CWA. See 33 C.F.R. pt. 328.3 (a) (3) (1999) (setting forth Migratory Bird Rule).
71. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 165 (discussing procedural history of SWANCC).
72. See id. at 174 (holding application of Migratory Bird Rule exceeded authority of Corps).
73. See id. (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44
(1994)) (discussing rationale for Court's decision).
74. See generally Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (explaining
multiple opinions of case).
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Instead, the Court's decision is divided into three distinct opinions:
(1) the plurality opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by three justices,
who voted to vacate and remand the decision of the Sixth Circuit
and impose significant limitations on the Corps's jurisdiction; 75 (2)
the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy, who wrote separately to
remand the Sixth Circuit's decision, but would impose lesser restrictions on the jurisdiction of the Corps 76 and (3) the dissent of
Justice Stevens, joined by three justices, who would affirm the decision of the Sixth Circuit, leaving the Corps's jurisdiction over the
77
wetlands fully intact.
A. Justice Scalia's Opinion
The opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas, Roberts and Alito, would impose significant limitations on the Corps's
jurisdiction over the nation's waters by drastically altering the permissible definition of "wetland" for purposes of the CWA. 78 Justice
Scalia began his analysis by focusing on the limitations imposed on
the Corps's jurisdiction, which was established in the Court's
SWANCC decision. 79 Justice Scalia observed that the Court's holding in SWANCC determined that Riverside Bayview did not establish
the Corps's jurisdiction over bodies of water that were not adjacent
80
to open water.
In light of this opinion and its limitations, Justice Scalia believed the Corps failed to take measures that reflected the Court's
holding in SWANCC when promulgating its regulations, and, as a
result, lower courts were still in the practice of granting jurisdiction
over bodies of water that were expressly barred from federal jurisdiction under the SWANCC decision. 8 ' Specifically, Justice Scalia
pointed to lower court decisions granting the Corps jurisdiction
75. See id. at 2235 (ordering case remanded to Sixth Circuit and calling for
Court to reconsider case under new test of Corps's jurisdiction).
76. See id. at 2252 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (ordering case remanded to
Sixth Circuit and calling for Court to reconsider case under "significant nexus"
test).
77. See id. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (voting to affirm holding of Sixth
Circuit).
78. See generally Wayne Whitlock & Norman Carlin, United States: The LongAwaited Rapanos Decision Narrows Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Over Wetland and
Tributaries, But Leaves Important Questions Unresolved, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING,
Aug. 2, 2006 (explaining limitations imposed by Scalia opinion).
79. See Rapanos, 126 S.Ct. at 2216-17 (plurality opinion) (discussing holdings
in Riverside Bayview and SWANCC).
80. See id. (explaining decision in SWANCC).
81. See id. at 2217 (discussing Corps's failure to amend regulations following
Supreme Court decision in SWANCC).
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over "'a roadside ditch' whose water took 'a winding, thirty-two-mile
path to the Chesapeake Bay,' irrigation ditches and drains that intermittently connect to covered waters, and (most implausibly of
all) the 'washes and arroyos' of an 'arid development site,' located
in the middle of the desert .
"..."82In Justice Scalia's view, the
Corps's jurisdiction over bodies of water such as these far exceeded
the authority the agency could reasonably exercise under the
CWA.8s

Justice Scalia argued that the Corps's jurisdiction must be realigned to reflect a more reasonable interpretation of the term "waters of the United States" under the CWA.8 4 Justice Scalia took a
literal view of the CWA's use of the word "waters" as opposed to
"water:" ".t]heuse of the definite article ('the') and the plural
number ('waters') show plainly that [section] 1362(7) does not refer to water in general."8 5 Having concluded that the CWA does
not aim to protect all of America's waters in general through his
analysis of the word "waters," Justice Scalia then attempted to discern what waters are protected by the CWA.8 6 To resolve his quandary, Justice Scalia consulted Webster's Dictionary for guidance:
"[t]he definition refers to 'streams,' 'oceans,' 'rivers,' 'lakes,' and
'bodies' of water 'forming geographical features."' 87 This definition would exclude "channels containing merely intermittent or
ephemeral flow." 88

Accordingly, Justice Scalia found that the

Corps's application of the CWA to "'ephemeral streams,' 'wet
meadows,' storm sewers and culverts, 'directional sheet flow during
82. See id. at 2218 (quoting United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 702 (4th
Cir. 2003); Community Assn. for Restoration of Env't v. Henry Bosma Dairy, 305
F.3d 943, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2002); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243
F.3d. 526, 534 (9th Cir. 2001)) (describing holdings of United States Courts of
Appeals granting broad jurisdiction to Corps).
83. See id. at 2224 (explaining Corps's interpretation of its jurisdiction under
CWA as impermissible).
84. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2220 (discussing need for Court to determine
reasonable interpretation of "navigable waters" under CWA). Justice Scalia stated
that "[t]he only natural definition of the term 'waters,' our prior and subsequent
judicial constructions of it, clear evidence from other provisions of the statute, and
this Court's canons of construction all confirm that 'the waters of the United
States' in [section] 1362(7) cannot bear the expansive meaning the Corps would
give it." Id.
85. See id. (discussing Justice Scalia's determination of meaning of "waters"
under CWA).
86. See id. at 2220-21 (discussing proper interpretation of "waters" under
CWA).
87. See id. at 2221 (discussing Justice Scalia's formulation of term "waters"
under CWA).
88. See id. at 2222 (discussing Justice Scalia's formulation of term "waters"
under CWA).
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storm events,' drain tiles, manmade drainage ditches, and dry arroyos .

.

. stretched the term 'waters of the United States' beyond

parody." 89

Justice Scalia asserted that such an expansive interpretation defied the policy considerations of Congress and brought "virtually all 'plan[ning of] the development and use . .. of land and

water resources' by States under federal control." 90
To abrogate the Corps's apparent abuse of authority, Justice
Scalia would rein in its ability to exercise its professional discretion
when determining which waters should be off-limits to commercial
development. 9 1 Justice Scalia argued that the Corps is powerless to
determine which waters may be considered "adjacent" to waters of
the United States for purposes of the CWA. 92 Although Justice
Scalia admitted that Riverside Bayview held that the Court should
defer to the Corps's determinations of what constitutes a wetland
where the nation's waters abutted land masses, 93 Justice Scalia also
posited that the Court's holding in SWANCC limited such determinations to only those wetlands that possess "a continuous surface
connection to bodies that are 'waters of the United States."94
Based on this holding, Justice Scalia concluded that the Corps's jurisdiction is limited by an objective, two-part, bright line test limiting its authority to deny permits to fill wetlands only to
circumstances where: (1) the adjacent channel in question "contains a water of the United States" and (2) "the wetland has a continuous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to
95
determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland' begins."
In light of his findings, Justice Scalia concluded that the Sixth
Circuit applied an overly broad test when determining whether the
properties in dispute fell within the jurisdiction of the Corps. 9 6 Because Justice Scalia found the Sixth Circuit had not applied a test
that would determine whether the properties possessed a continuous surface connection to the "waters of the United States," he or89. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2222 (discussing Justice Scalia's disapproval of

Corps's application of CWA).
90. See id. at 2223-24 (discussing adverse effects caused by Corps's application

of CWA).
91. See generally id. at 2226 (discussing limited nature of Corps's authority).
92. See id. (discussing limited nature of Corps's authority).
93. See id. (discussing Court's holding in Riverside Bayview).
94. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2226 (discussing Justice Scalia's method of determining proper application of CWA).
95. See id. at 2227 (discussing Justice Scalia's method of determining proper
application of CWA).
96. See id. at 2235 (discussing Sixth Circuit's determination of applicable test
in dispute).
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dered the judgment vacated and asked the court to reconsider the
97
case under his interpretation of the breadth of the CWA.
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy offered a more
moderate assessment of the Corps's jurisdiction under the CWA,
and although he would impose certain restrictions on the Corps's
authority, the restrictions he recommended were far less drastic
than the measures proposed by Justice Scalia. 98 According to Justice Kennedy, the issue at stake was whether "the Corps' regulations, as applied to the wetlands [in dispute], constitute a
reasonable interpretation of 'navigable waters' as in Riverside
Bayview or an invalid construction as in SWANCC[.]" 99 Specifically,
Justice Kennedy found:
Taken together these cases establish that in some instances, as exemplified by Riverside Bayview, the connection between a nonnavigable water or wetland and a
navigable water may be so close, or potentially so close,
the Corps may deem the water or wetland a "navigable
water" under the Act. In other instances, as exemplified
by SWANCC, there may be little or no connection. Absent
a significant nexus,jurisdiction under the Act is lacking.1 0 0
To Justice Kennedy then, the key to determining the Corps's
jurisdiction over a given wetland lay in whether such wetland possessed a "significant nexus" to a navigable waterway. 10 1 According
to Justice Kennedy, such a nexus could be determined to exist
where such wetlands "either alone or in combination with similarly
situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily
understood as 'navigable"' and would exclude those whose effects
on the quality of navigable waters "are only speculative or insubstantial."' 0 2 Justice Kennedy's test thus eschewed the stringent requirements of Justice Scalia's test, allowing the Corps to possess more
97. See id. (remanding case to Sixth Circuit).
98. See id. at 2241 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing issue of case).
99. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2241 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (formulating
framework for Court's inquiries).
100. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting effect of cases).
101. See id. (KennedyJ, concurring) (discussing necessity of wetlands containing significant nexus to navigable waters).
102. See id. at 2248 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating how to establish "significant nexus").
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flexibility in determining which wetlands may be considered protected under the CWA. 10 3 Yet, while Justice Kennedy's "significant
nexus" test was significantly broader in determining what constituted a wetland, it nevertheless imposed new limitations on the
Corps's jurisdiction by disallowing the Corps to regulate any body
of water that possessed a hydrological connection to navigable
104

waters.

C.

The Dissent

Justice Stevens's dissent was highly critical of both Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion andJustice Kennedy's concurrence.1 0 5 To
Justice Stevens, the Corps's jurisdiction over the waters in question
was not even a close call; instead, Justice Stevens viewed its authority
10 6

to regulate the wetlands as "straightforward."

Justice Stevens found the issue of whether the Corps had jurisdiction over the wetlands in question to fit squarely within the
Court's prior decision in Riverside Bayview.10 7 According to Justice
Stevens, the issue at hand in Riverside Bayviewv was whether the CWA
"'authorize[d] the Corps to require landowners to obtain permits
from the Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to navigable waters and their tributaries.""0 8 Justice Stevens interpreted the Riverside Bayview decision as holding that the Corps
possessed the authority to determine when and where a wetland
may be deemed to have an important effect on the ecosystem and
to grant permits based on its findings.' 0 9 Justice Stevens further
argued that Justice Scalia's assertion that the Corps's jurisdiction
was overbroad was erroneous because the Corps also possessed the
discretion to allow individuals to fill wetlands when they determined
103. See id. at 2250 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing possibility that significant nexus may exist in cases in dispute).
104. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2251 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing
prior Corps practice of entertaining jurisdiction where any hydrological connection to navigable waters existed).
105. See generally id. at 2252-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining faults in
plurality justification for ordering decision of Sixth Circuit be remanded).
106. See id. at 2252 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining determination that
Corps's properly entertained jurisdiction over wetlands).
107. See id. at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that Court's decision
in Riverside Bayview controls current dispute).
108. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (quoting United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985)) (discussing issue of
case).
109. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2255-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (determining
Riverside Bayview to hold that Corps has discretion to determine when wetland may
be deemed to have significant effect on adjacent waterways).
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that filling such wetlands would pose no significant detrimental effects on adjacent waterways. 1 10
Justice Stevens also disagreed with Justice Scalia's interpretation of the effect of the Court's holding in SWANCC."' I According
to Justice Stevens, the SWANCC decision was of little relevance to
the matter before the Court because "SWANCC had nothing to say
about wetlands, let alone about wetlands adjacent to traditionally
navigable waters or their tributaries."'1 2 Rather, the SWANCC decision was concerned only with "nonnavigable, isolated, intrastate waters" and therefore was distinct from the matter at hand.' 3
Finally, Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice Scalia's view that
granting an expansive view of what may be deemed protected
under the CWA imposed impermissible economic burdens on the
economy. 114 Justice Stevens argued that such considerations exceeded the power of the judiciary and that it was not the court's
duty to make determinations as to whether "particular conservation
measures outweigh their costs.""15 Instead, Justice Stevens found

that such determinations should be addressed solely by the elected
officials in Congress. 116 In this case, Justice Stevens found that relevant congressional history supported a finding that Congress in-

tended the CWA to grant the Corps broad jurisdiction, and only
when Congress decides to curtail such jurisdiction may the Corps's
17
jurisdiction be limited."
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

By remanding the decision of the Sixth Circuit, the plurality
called into question federal regulations that had, until this decision,
110. See id. at 2258 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (finding
Corps's jurisdiction over wetlands reasonable).
111. See id. at 2256 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (findingJustice Scalia's opinion to
misinterpret Court's holding in SWANCQ.
112. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (determining SWANCC decision to be off
point in present dispute).
113. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (determining SWANCC decision to be off
point in present dispute).
114. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2259 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing economic burden imposed by broad interpretation of CWA).
115. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing limitations of judiciary's
authority).
116. See id. (Stevens,J, dissenting) (finding scope ofjudicial authority did not
extend to limiting Corps's jurisdiction).
117. See id. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding judiciary did not have
authority to limit jurisdiction of Corps).
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withstood over thirty years of judicial and legislative scrutiny. 118
Both the opinions of Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy failed to
properly consider the effect of Supreme Court precedent when arriving at their conclusions.' 19 Additionally, Justice Scalia's opinion
failed to pay adequate deference to Congress's policy considerations underlying its passage of the CWA and therefore unjustifiably
120
encroaches upon the powers of Congress.
A.

Failure to Properly Adhere to Precedent

Neither the opinion of Justice Scalia nor that of Justice Kennedy provides an adequate basis to distinguish the Court's holding
in Riverside Bayview from the issue raised by the petitioners. 12 1 As
Justice Stevens correctly asserted, the Court's decision in Riverside
Bayview appears to squarely address the issue before the Court by
holding that the Corps's jurisdiction extended to both waters lying
adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their tributaries. 122 The
Court in Riverside Bayview arrived at this conclusion by looking to
the express intent of Congress to restore the integrity of the na123
tion's waters.
Congress, cognizant of the difficulties inherent in accomplishing its goal due to the complex nature of water pollution, adopted a
broad definition of the term "waters" rather than attempting to employ a bright line definition.' 24 The Court determined that wetlands lying adjacent to waters of the United States were properly
covered by the CWA and within the Corps's jurisdiction based on a
showing by the Corps that such waters "as a general matter play a
118. See Savage, supra note 14, at M3 (discussing implications of Rapanos
decision).
119. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's opinion's failure to adequately consider Supreme Court precedent, see infra notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's opinion's failure to adequately consider Supreme Court precedent, see infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.

120. For a further discussion of Justice Scalia's plurality opinion's failure to
pay adequate deference to Congress, see infra notes 151-64 and accompanying

text.
121. SeeRapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2255 (StevensJ., dissenting) (determining issue
in Rapanos dispute to fit squarely within Court's decision in Riverside Bayview).
122. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (determining issue in Rapanos to fit
squarely within Court's decision in Riverside Bayview).
123. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985) (discussing congressional purpose of CWA).
124. See id. at 132-33 (discussing congressional intent in broadly defining term
"waters" under CWA). The Corps acknowledged the difficulty in adequately determining which waters required protection under the CWA, saying "[t] he regulation
of activities that cause water pollution cannot rely on .. . artificial lines .. . but
must focus on all waters that together form the entire aquatic system." Id.
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key role in protecting and enhancing water quality."1 2 5 To the Riverside Bayview Court then, the decisive factor in rendering its judgment was Congress's intent to grant the Corps broad federal
regulatory authority and its deference to the Corps's ecological
judgment in determining which waters may impact the quality of
126
the nation's waters.
1. Justice Scalia's Opinion
Justice Scalia attempted to sidestep the binding effect of Riverside Bayview on the dispute before the Court by employing a narrow
interpretation of the case's holding and attempting to limit that
holding to the specific facts presented in that case. 127 Justice Scalia
specifically cited to the Riverside Bayview Court's observation that
"the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends
and land begins" as support for the assertion that the Riverside
Bayview decision held only that the Corps possessed jurisdiction to
regulate "wetlands that 'actually abutted' traditional navigable waters." 128 Scalia's choice of citations from the Riverside Bayview decision was misleading, however, and could hardly be said to do justice
to the Court's actual determinations in that case. 129 Indeed, one
need look only to the language directly following this quotation to
understand that the scope of the Court's decision in that case was
in fact much broader than Justice Scalia would have the reader believe. 130 Although the Court acknowledged that the Corps had a
duty to determine when and where "waters" protected under the
CWA began, they also recognized that doing so is "no easy task" and
that when considering semi-aquatic areas typically considered wetlands, the determination of where these waters begins is "far from
13 1
obvious."

125. See id. at 133 (discussing Corps's jurisdiction over waters lying adjacent to
waters of the United States).
126. See id. (discussing Court's reasoning in interpreting CWA to extend to
wetlands lying adjacent to waters of United States).
127. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2216 (discussing Court's holding in Riverside
Bayview).
128. See id. (discussing Court's holding in Riverside Bayview).
129. For a further discussion of Justice Scalia's misleading reference to Riverside Bayview, see infra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
130. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985) (discussing Corps's jurisdiction under CWA).
131. See id. (discussing difficulty in discerning boundaries between wetlands

and waters).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol18/iss2/2

16

Currie: Opening the Floodgates: The Roberts Court's Decision in Rapanos v

2007]

OPENING THE FLOODGATES

225

Justice Scalia's proposed "wetlands test" flies in the face of the
Court's reasoning in Riverside Bayview.1 3 2 The testJustice Scalia created to determine whether a landmass is covered by the CWA transforms what the Riverside Bayview Court viewed as a difficult task into
a simple determination.1 3 3 According to Scalia, one need only determine whether a continuous surface connection exists between a
wetland and an adjacent water of the United States to decide
whether that wetland is covered under the CWA.134 The considerations employed under this test can hardly be said to be overly complex; rather, the test appears to evaluate only "obvious" factors, and
as such, the test cannot be said to consider the same criteria envi135
sioned by the Riverside Bayview Court.
Scalia attempted to offset his cursory treatment of the Riverside
Bayview decision by over-exaggerating the Court's subsequent decision in SWANCC. 13 6 Scalia interpreted the Court's decision in
SWANCC as standing for the proposition that the Court may impose
limitations on the Corps's ability to define the "waters of the United
States" for purposes of the CWA, and that such authority extends to
the waters in dispute before the Court. 13 7 Scalia's interpretation of
this precedent was erroneous however, as the Court's decision in
SWANCC addressed the application of the CWA's protection over
138
isolated wetlands for the purpose of protecting migratory birds.
Accordingly, SWANCC does not address the petitioners' argument.1 3 9 Unlike Riverside Bayview, the Court in SWANCC did not
consider whether Congress intended the CWA to apply to waters
lying adjacent to "navigable waters," and because this was the question at the heart of the petitioner's dispute, Scalia's emphasis on
1 40
the SWANCC decision was inappropriate.
132. For a further discussion of Justice Scalia's misleading reference to Riverside Bayview, see supra notes 129-31, infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion ofJustice Scalia's attempts to over-simplify the considerations of the Riverside Bayview Court, see infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
134. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2226-27 (discussing breadth of protection offered to wetlands under CWA).
135. See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132-33 (discussing complex nature of
determining which wetlands are covered under CWA).
136. For a further discussion of Scalia's over-emphasis on SWANCC, see infra
notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
137. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2217 (discussing Court's holding in SWANCC).
138. See SWANCC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 171-72 (2001)
(refusing to apply Court's holding in Riverside Bayview to isolated ponds because
they serve as habitat for migratory birds).
139. For a discussion of'Justice Scalia's erroneous application of the SWANCC
opinion to the dispute in Rapanos, see supra notes 136-38, infra note 140 and accompanying text.
140. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162 (discussing issue before Court).
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2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy's concurrence similarly failed to give the
Court's decision in Riverside Bayview adequate deference, albeit less
egregiously than Justice Scalia's opinion.14 1 Although expressly de14 2
Jusnouncing the severe limitations thatJustice Scalia proposed,
tice Kennedy would impose limits on the Corps's authority that are
unsupported by the Supreme Court jurisprudence. 143 Justice Kennedy's argument for the imposition of limits on the Corps's authority fails to homogenize his position with the Court's broad holding
in Riverside Bayview and the Court's apparent satisfaction in that
case concerning the Corps's authority to determine when it is appropriate to grant permits to wetlands lying adjacent to national
144
waterways.
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy's proposed significant nexus
test found its only source of authority in the SWANCC case rather
than Riverside Bayview, which was more on point in the Rapanos dispute. 145 Again, the SWANCC decision dealt with the Corps's authority to impose restrictions on inland ponds, 146 where Riverside
Bayview specifically addressed the Corps's authority over wetlands
lying adjacent to navigable waters. 147 Justice Kennedy's concurrence relied too heavily on the SWANCC Court's passing reference
to a "significant nexus" when he should have instead formed his
opinion based on the Court's holding in Riverside Bayview. 148 Riverside Bayview determined that the application of CWA protection to
141. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's failure to adhere to precedent, see
supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
142. See Rapanos 126 S. Ct. at 2242 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing test
imposed by Justice Scalia). Justice Kennedy found Justice Scalia's test to be "without support in the language and purposes of the [CWA] or in our cases interpreting it." Id.
143. See id. at 2249 (requiring Corps to show significant nexus when enforcing
CWA).
144. For a further discussion ofJustice Kennedy's failure to adhere to precedent, see supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
145. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2249 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (requiring
Corps to show significant nexus when enforcing CWA). See also SWANCC v. US.
Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 185 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing considerations of Riverside Bayview Court); Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2264 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (questioning justice Kennedy's reliance on significant nexus test).
146. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162 (discussing issue before Court).
147. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985) (discussing issue before Court).
148. See Rapanos, S. Ct. 126 at 2256 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
SWANCC from Riverside Bayview). Justice Stevens explained that "SWANCC had
nothing to say about wetlands, let alone about wetlands adjacent to traditionally
navigable water or their tributaries." Id.
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waters adjacent to navigable waters is proper when the Corps's ecological judgment deems it to be so. 149 Therefore, Justice Kennedy's

reliance on what may properly be described as dicta in the SWANCC
opinion caused Justice Kennedy to arrive at a conclusion that is
150
contrary to the precedent set forth in Riverside Bayview.
B.

Critique of Justice Scalia's Policy Analysis

Justice Scalia's opinion acts to undermine Congress's policy
considerations in enacting the CWA. 15 1 The Corps's authority to
impose its own reasonable interpretation of the term "waters" when
15 2
enforcing the CWA is sourced in a power backed by Congress.
As the Court stated in Chevron, where "Congress has explicitly left a
gap for [a governmental] agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of
the statute by regulation." 5 3 An agency's elucidation of such a provision will be considered enforceable where it is "based on a permissible construction of the statute. 1

54

As stated above, the Court

concluded in Riverside Bayview that Congress's decision not to set
forth a precise definition of the term "waters" under the CWA was a
reflection of its desire to create a broad definition of that term,
thereby abrogating any limitations that might result from its attempts to craft a definition of the term. 155 Moreover, not only did
the Riverside Bayview Court determine that Congress intended to
leave this "gap" in the legislation, but the Court also concluded that
the Corps's practice of applying the definition to wetlands lying adjacent to "navigable waters" constituted a permissible construction
156
of the term under the CWA.

Justice Scalia's attempt to circumvent the legislative power by
passing the Corps's treatment of the CWA off as "impermissible" is
149. See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132-33 (discussing Corps's proper application of CWA).
150. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's formulation of the "significant
nexus" test, see supra note 14549 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of Justice Scalia's opinion's failure to properly assess
environmental concerns, see infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
152. See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132-33 (discussing congressional intent
to grant broad authority to Corps).
153. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(describing authority of governmental agencies).
154. See id. at 843 (discussing agency's ability to interpret statutes).
155. See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 132 (explaining Congress's intent to define "waters" broadly under CWA).
156. See id.at 133 (determining Corps's interpretation of CWA to be
permissible).
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wrought with erroneous assertions. 57 In proposing the imposition
of significant limitations on the Corps, Justice Scalia faced a significant challenge - limiting the Corps's authority while simultaneously refraining from frustrating the intent of Congress in passing
the CWA. 158 In attempting to overcome this hurdle, Justice Scalia
presented examples of instances where district courts have given
liberal treatment to the CWA and concluded on that basis that the
CWA will still act to effectively limit pollution of the nation's waters. 15 9 Members of the environmental community, however, do
not supportJustice Scalia's determinations of the environmental effect of his limitations.1 60 Rather, some have argued that Justice
Scalia's opinion "shows no awareness of what hydrologic investigations have demonstrated about the interconnectedness of ground
and surface waters."' 161 Indeed, field data supports the finding that
"groundwater moves [and] that it regularly feeds surface streams or
62
lakes, often keeping these waters flowing between rainstorms."'
In light of such findings, Justice Scalia's proposed test would significantly impede the effectiveness of the CWA in restoring the "integrity" of the nation's waters because the Corps would be unable to
163
regulate factors that are critical in protecting the nation's waters.
Therefore, Justice Scalia's attempt to impose limitations on the
Corps without frustrating the policy considerations of Congress fails
64
entirely.1

157. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2224 (2006) (discussing permissibility of Corps's construction of "waters" under CWA).
158. For a discussion of an agency's ability to interpret gaps left in laws passed
by Congress, see supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
159. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2227-28 (discussing lower courts' treatment of

CWA).
160. See Donald Kennedy & Brooks Hanson, What's a Wetland, Anyhow?, Sci.,
Aug. 25, 2006, at 1019 (discussing environmental considerations of Justice Scalia).
161. See id. (discussing Scalia's lack of comprehension of ecological
considerations).
162. See id. (demonstrating Scalia's lack of awareness of findings of hydrologic
investigations).
163. See generally id. (discussing Justice Scalia's failure to grasp important environmental concepts in opinion).
164. For a discussion ofJustice Scalia's policy analysis, see supra notes 151-64
and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol18/iss2/2

20

Currie: Opening the Floodgates: The Roberts Court's Decision in Rapanos v

2007]

OPENING THE FLOODGATES

VI.

IMPACT

A. Justice Scalia's Opinion
Justice Scalia's opinion does not currently possess any significant weight of authority because it is not a majority opinion. 1 65 If a
majority of the Court had adopted the opinion, however, it could
have proved disastrous for the nation's environment. 1 66 Justice
Scalia's "continuous adjacent surface connection" test would significantly limit the federal government's power to impose CWA restrictions throughout the nation, thereby hindering the government's
ability to deter future pollution of a significant portion of the na167
tion's waterways.
The test's effects would be widespread - "most streams" and
wetlands in the nation's interior would lose CWA protection, 168 and
seasonal western waterways that account for millions of "stream
miles" would have their CWA protection revoked because they flow
only intermittently.' 69 Removing these streams from CWA protection would have significant consequences: "[t] he net effect is that
seasonal streams and wetlands could disappear, further stressing
perennial rivers with more pollution by removing the capillary
water systems that feed them. With the loss of these capillaries, the
165. See Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2236 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining that because no opinion commanded majority, proper interpretation of
Corps's jurisdiction was uncertain).
166. See MorningEdition: High Court Splits on Clean Water Act Case (NPR radio
broadcast June 20, 2006) (discussing possibility of Justice Scalia's opinion commanding majority of Court). In response to the Rapanos decision, Jim Murphy of
the National Wildlife Federation stated: "IfJustice Scalia's view had prevailed, we'd
really be talking about a complete disaster." Id.
167. For a discussion of the potential effect Justice Scalia's proposed test
would have on our nation's waters, see infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
168. See Savage, supra note 14, at M3 (discussing potential impact of Justice
Scalia's opinion if adopted by majority).
169. See Tebbutt, supra note 13, at F1 (discussing potential impact of Justice
Scalia's test if implemented in environmental enforcement). See also, Sandra
Zellmer, Supreme Court Drops the Ball On Issue of Wetlands Protection,LINCOLN J. STAR,
July 10, 2006, at B4 (discussing potential effect of Justice Scalia's opinion).
Zellmer argued:
If Scalia had convinced Justice Kennedy to join in his opinion, many - in
fact, most - wetlands and streams would be excluded from federal protection. Many of the remaining wetlands are not adjacent to navigable waters, and the National Hydrology Dataset shows that nearly 60 percent of
the total stream miles in the United States are nonperennial. In Western
states like New Mexico, Colorado and Nebraska, the figure is much
higher: 80 to 90 percent of their streams flow only in wet weather.
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main arteries also would clog, weaken and even dry up."170 The
serious detrimental effects ofJustice Scalia's new formulation would
not be limited to rural areas; rather, they could also lead to disastrous consequences in urban areas as well.' 7 1 For example, smaller
wetlands in New York State that do not possess the requisite continuous surface connection under Justice Scalia's test provide critical
172
water sources to New York City.
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
173
The concurrence offered by Justice Kennedy is, arguably,
the authority to be followed by lower courts when determining
whether a body of water constitutes a wetland for purposes of the
CWA.' 74 Although the opinion does not pose significant threats to
the future of the nation's waters as that of Justice Scalia, 175 the
opinion nevertheless will undoubtedly be the source of confusion
and uncertainty for lower courts and members of the Corps. 17 6 Fur-

170. See Tebbutt, supranote 13, at F1 (discussing effect of removing rivers and
streams from protection under CWA).
171. For a discussion of the potential effect Justice Scalia's proposed test
could have on urban areas, see supra notes 165-70, infra note 172 and accompanying text.
172. See Interpretingthe Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Decision in the Joint
Cases of Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on
"The Waters of the United States:" HearingBefore the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http:epw.senate.gov/hearing-statements.cfm?id=260397 (statement of Senator Hilary Rodham Clinton (D-NY)) (explaining potential effect of Justice Scalia's
opinion on New York City).
173. See States Fear Increased Wetlands Workload in Wake of Rapanos Ruling,
ENVTL. POL'v ALERT, Sept. 27, 2006 (discussing government's understanding of
plurality opinion). "The Justice Department (DOJ) has been instructing lower
courts since the ruling to apply either the Scalia or Kennedy tests, as appropriate."
Id. But see Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2265 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that lower courts should reinstate judgments in Rapanos and Carabell
if either Justice Scalia's or Justice Kennedy's tests were satisfied).
174. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that
where plurality forwards no single rationale for holding, holding is that of the
narrowest scope).
175. See Interpretingthe Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Decision in the Joint
Cases of Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on
"The Waters of the United States:" Hearingbefore the Senate Environment and Public Works
Subcomittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water, 109th Cong. (2006) (Statement of William W. Buzbee, Professor, Emory Law School), availableat http://epw.senate.gov/
109th/Buzbee_.Testimony.pdf (explaining impact of Justice Kennedy's concurrence on environment). Buzbee explained that "Justice Kennedy's 'significant
nexus' articulation ends up creating an overwhelming overlap with long-established regulatory approaches, as well as with the approaches articulated in the Justice Stevens Rapanos [sic] dissent for four other justices." Id.
176. See George J. Mannina, "Waters of the US.:" Definition Remains in Doubt
After Supreme Court Ruling, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., Aug. 18, 2006, available at
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thermore, due to the requirements of Justice Kennedy's significant
nexus test, the opinion will impose widespread financial burdens
7
that were nonexistent prior to the Rapanos decision.' 7
Confusion in the lower courts following the Supreme Court's
decision in Rapanos is already apparent. 78 The Northern District
of Texas concluded that the "'significant nexus' test came with no
guidance," and instead, the court consulted Fifth Circuit case law in
determining what constituted a significant nexus. 7 9 The Middle
District of Florida rendered a decision upholding the application of
the CWA on the basis that the facts of the case would hold up under
180
either Justice Scalia or Justice Kennedy's proposed tests.
Adhering to Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test places tremendous burdens on the EPA's administration of wetland enforcement.18 1 The decision will impede the Corps's ability to regulate
because it will require the agency to take extra steps when deciding
www.wlf.org/upload/081816mannina.pdf (explaining state of law post-Rapanos).
Mannina explained:
So, when is a stream, river or lake 'relatively permanent?' For the plurality, a relatively permanent water body is one where there is a water flow or
presence for more than one month since the plurality uses the plural
,some months.' But that area may also be dry for 'some months.' Where
to drawn [sic] the line is not very clear. The guidance offered by the
plurality is that '[c]ommon sense and common usage distinguish between a wash and a seasonal river.' However, the plurality declined 'to
decide exactly when the drying-up of a stream bed is continuous and frequent enough to disqualify the channel as a 'water of the United States.'
Id. at 2.
177. See Lucy Kafanov, Senators, Experts Butt Heads Over Supreme Court's CWA
Ruling, ENv'T AND ENERGY DAILY, Aug. 2, 2006 (explaining financial consequence
of Rapanos decision).

Kafanov asserted that

[B]ased on the testimony of lawmakers, Bush administration officials, legal experts and other interested parties, potential remedies have multiplied as fast as interpretations of the decision. The one fact agreed on by
all is that a failure to swiftly act to clarify the scope and meaning of the
Rapanos decision will result in a costly quagmire of litigation.
Id.
178. See Kevin Holewinski & Ryan D. Dahl, Rapanos: Putting the Government to
Its Proof Under the Clean Water Act, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Aug. 21, 2006, availableat
www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs-detail.aspx?pubID=S3627

(describing decisions by

lower courts following Rapanos decision).
179. See id. (discussing decision by Northern District of Texas regarding significant nexus test).
180. See id. (discussing decision by Middle District of Florida upholding application of CWA under both Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy's tests).
181. See Michael S. Giannotto, Gregory A. Bibler & Kevin P. Pechulis, Supreme
Court Requires "Significant Nexus" to Navigable Waters for Jurisdictionunder Clean Water
Act Section 404, ENVTL. AND ENERGY ADviSORY, July 5, 2006, at 5, available at
www.goodwinprotcor.com (follow "publications" hyperlink, then follow "view all
publications" hyperlink) (discussing impact significant nexus test will have on

Corps).
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whether to issue CWA permits to developers.' 8 2 To satisfy the significant nexus test, the Corps will most often be required to make
scientific findings to establish the existence of such a nexus each
time it decides whether to grant or deny a developer a permit to fill
wetlands. 8 3 The process will result in increased uncertainty, both
with respect to the EPA in its efforts to adequately assess the merits
of each section 404 permit as well as for those seeking such
84

permits. 1

C.

The Fate of the Environment in the Hands of the Roberts
Court

As the first major environmental issue addressed by the Roberts Court, the Rapanos decision offers noteworthy insight into the
treatment that environmental issues will likely receive from the
Court. 1 85 The case reveals a clear divide between the Scalia "bloc"

and the Justice Stevens dissenters, and given the great disparity between the views expressed by these two contingents, it is unlikely
that a middle ground will ever be forged between them. 186 Consequently, given the current makeup of the Court, Justice Kennedy
will likely play a key role in the direction the Court takes with envi87
ronmental cases in the near future.'
The alignment of Justices Roberts and Alito with the views ex88
pressed by Justice Scalia is a cause for deep concern to some.
Justice Scalia's opinion, which possessed a striking antagonism to182. See id. (explaining impact of Rapanos on Corps's authority). "If the
Corps were to follow Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which seems likely, it henceforth must establish a 'significant nexus' on a case-by-case basis between wetlands
and a navigable water before it asserts jurisdiction ..
" Id.
183. See id. (explaining difficulty of implementing significant nexus test).
184. See Interpretingthe Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Decision in theJoint
Cases ofRapanos v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers on
"The Waters of the United States:" Testimony before the Committee on Environmental and Public Works Subcomittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Water, 109th Cong. 6
(2006) (Statement ofJonathan H. Adler, Professor of Law and Co-Director, Western Reserve University School of Law), available at http://epw.senate.gov/109th/
AdlerTestimony.pdf (discussing potential effect of Justice Kennedy's significant
nexus test).
185. See On Divided Court, Kennedy Emerges as Key in Future Environment Suits,
DEF. ENV'T ALERT, June 27, 2006, (discussing future of Supreme Court).
186. See id. (explaining differences in views expressed in opinions of Justices
Scalia and Stevens).
187. See id. (discussing Justice Kennedy's potential influence on environmental concerns in Court's near future).
188. See High Court's Divisions May Limit Legal Certainty In Environmental Suits,
RISK POL'V REP., June 27, 2006 (explaining concern expressed regarding Justices
Alito and Roberts alignment with Scalia bloc). "[I] t's a bad sign [for the environment] that Roberts and Alito joined Scalia and Thomas." Id.
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ward the environment,1 8 9 would have simultaneously dismantled
environmental legislation that had stood for over thirty years while
displaying a "radical rejection of the twenty-year-old Riverside
Bayview Court precedent."1 9 0 Justices Roberts and Alito's apparent
acquiescence to the views of Justice Scalia signals dangerous times
ahead - this time the dismantling of the CWA was only a "closecall," but should the makeup of the Court shift any further toward
the position of Justice Scalia in the future, the nation may not be so
lucky.

19 1

Bill Currie
189. See id. (discussing opinion of Justice Scalia).
190. See Statement of Buzbee, supra note 175, at 4 (explaining effects of Kennedy's concurrence on America's waters).
191. See Statement of Clinton, supranote 172 (describing decision in Rapanos
as "close call").
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